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Abstract: In response to economic pressures and the growing expectation of citizens, the 
framework of service delivery in the public service sector has changed continually. Market-based 
reform strategies such as privatisation, corporatisation, joined-up government and public-private 
partnerships have dominated the current framework of public service delivery around the globe.  
The adoption of these strategies has changed not only the framework of service delivery but also 
the notion of accountability. The objective of this paper is to examine the way in which the notion 
of accountability has developed in public service delivery, focusing on the adoption of policy 
strategies under the market state model. Studies show that the framework of accountability in 
the context of public sector reform appears to be complex, especially in the era of market state 
model.  The involvement of the private sector as a public partner in delivering public services has 
significantly changed the notion of accountability and we argue that to some extent 
accountability tends to be eclipsed due to the changes in its accountability focus. 




Accountability is a core value of public governance and management.  The concept of 
accountability has a direct relationship with the framework of service delivery and the model of 
the state. This means that accountability developed as the framework of service delivery and the 
model of the state was enhanced. This section discusses two primary issues: first, the 
development of the accountability concept in the context of public sector reform. Under this 
issue, the discussion embraces the development of the accountability concept from the pre-NPM 
which involved three models of the state: liberal-democratic, social state, bureaucratic state, 
and NPM and post-NPM era under the market state model.  Second, the discussion highlights the 
issues of accountability in the context of the market state model.  The market state model is 
referred as a focal point because the concept of accountability has obviously changed following 
the adoption of different policy strategies under the market state model, such as network, 
joined-up government, and public-private partnership.   
 
2. The Concept of accountability 
In a simple definition, Roberts and Scapens (1985) define accountability as “the giving and 
demanding of reasons for conduct in which people are required to explain and take 
responsibility for their actions” (p. 447).  The definition implies that the process of “being called 
to account” involves regular face-to-face contact (Roberts & Scapens, 1985) between two 
parties that are known as ‘account giver’ (accountor) and ‘account receiver’ (accountee) 
(Mulgan, 2000).  The process of “being called to account” has been accepted as a core definition 
for accountability by all scholars in the area of accountability, although at the ground level the 
concept of accountability has been widely debated from two perspectives, known as normative 
and mechanism  (Bovens, 2010; Mulgan, 2000; Willems & Van Dooren, 2012).   
The definition of Roberts and Scapens (1985) implies that the model of accountability or 
account giving process is characterised by three core features (Bovens, 2010; De Vries, 2007; 
Haque, 2007).  The first feature is about the reporting function (Parker & Gould, 1999); the 
 
 
second feature is related to social relations and interactions (Mulgan, 2000); and the third 
feature is connected to the moral order and legitimate structure which defines rights and 
obligations, including the right to hold others to account (Conrad, 2005).  These three features 
have been regarded by Dubnick and Frederickson (2009) as input, process and output.  The 
features are closely interrelated as they portray the process of giving account in three phases, 
namely the information, judgement and consequence phases.  Table 1 presents the features of 
accountability in the process of giving account (see Appendix 1). 
In sum, accountability can be understood as a formal relationship between two parties, 
where one of the parties has the authority to assign or negotiate with another party regarding 
the responsibilities and performance, ideally with agreed-upon expectations and standards.  
The following subsections discuss the enhancement of the concept of accountability following 
the development of the role of the state and the framework of public service delivery in the era 
of pre-NPM, NPM and post-NPM.  
3. Pre-NPM and the Model of Accountability 
The structure of the public sector during the era of the liberal-democratic state was 
characterised by the traditional system of public bureaucracy, which highly emphasised the 
principal-agent relationship.  The model of accountability during this era was highly tailored 
according to the three core features: input, process and output.  The process of giving account 
was implemented in a linear manner with an emphasis on a systematic input-output process.  
Therefore, accountability was constructed in the form of a vertical or hierarchical relationship 
which involved a top-down relationship (Bovens, 2007; De Vries, 2007; Ryan & Walsh, 2004).  
This traditional model of accountability was also known as hierarchical or vertical 
accountability.   
In order to maintain a principal-agent relationship, hierarchical accountability employs 
various means, such as rules and regulations as well as procedures, to ensure compliance with 
the implementation of certain expectations (Jos & Tompkins, 2004).   Strategically, the principal 
(the accountee) reserves the rights to call for account, including demanding answers and 
imposing sanctions.  Under this linear relationship, in the case of fraud, corruption or policy 
failure for instance, there will be a person who is held accountable and who has to face the 
consequences of his or her action (Brandsma, 2007; Haque, 2007).   
However, hierarchical accountability was seen as too rigid when it came to practice.  The 
problems of rigidity arise from the weaknesses of the principal-agent relationship which allows 
domination of power by the principal over the agent. The rights to call for account, demand 
answers and impose sanctions was seen as “product of authoritarian relationship” (Parker & 
Gould, 1999, p. 116) that generates fear and destroys trust among individuals in organisation 
(Harber & Ball, 2003).   Behn (2000) has equated this form of accountability with “punishment”.  
According to Behn (2000), “when people seek to hold someone accountable, they are usually 
planning some kind of punishment” (p.4).   
Although hierarchical accountability highly stressed the compliance value, in many 
instances the reliance on hierarchical oversight and control failed to ensure accountability, due 
to its rigidity.  Moreover, the practice of hierarchical accountability had come under pressure 
following the rapid development of the social state model and bureaucratic model in the late 
1970s (Halligan, 2007; Siddique, 2006).  Hierarchical accountability does not fit well in either 
the social state model or the bureaucratic model. Both the state models emphasised not only the 
principal-agent relationship but also a division of labour and adherence to rules and spans of 
control (Jones & Kettl, 2003).  The growing division of labour had expanded the role of the state 
in governing the system of government.  At the same time, the number of professionals in the 
public sector had grown, which then reinforced the need to harness managerialism to the 
political accountability.   
Following this development, according to Day and Klein (1987) “the assumption that 
civil servants were accountable to ministers and that ministers in turn, were accountable to 
parliament  no longer matched reality . . . if the link had not actually fractured, they were no 
 
 
longer effective” (p. 33).  Mulgan (2000) also argues that the core of accountability or the 
process of giving account is contestable on the ground and has increasingly been extended 
beyond the notion of “giving an account”.  In further argument, Mulgan (2000) highlights that 
“the previous accountability feature leads to questions about different channels of 
accountability and their relative merits, about the balance between accountability and 
efficiency, and about distinctions between political and managerial accountability” (p.556).  This 
indicates that the traditional and the straight line accountability relationship were no longer 
appropriate with the emerging reality of public administration (Dubnick, 2005; Dubnick & 
Frederickson, 2009; Mulgan, 2000; Sinclair, 1995; Thomas, 2003).    
Practically, the establishment of the bureaucracy system under the social state model 
and the bureaucratic model increased the size, roles and functions of the bureaucrats.  In 
relation to this development, the notion of accountability also enhanced and shaped various 
kinds of relationships, including administrative and ombudsmen, which reflected the 
bureaucracy’s control over the administrative functions (Day & Klein, 1987).  For these reasons, 
the forms of accountability relationship became diversified according to the needs of the 
bureaucratic systems.  Scholars agreed that accountability should also be acknowledged from 
the multiple ways in which accountability is experienced (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Sinclair, 
1995; Stone, 1995). Understanding accountability from its relationships helps to clarify the 
concept of accountability as the forms of accountability changed according to the context of 
relationships in which the policy actors were involved.  This is because accountability is no 
longer about formal requirements which involve top-down control but it is also a matter of 
interpersonal relationships (Stone, 1995).  Table 2 shows the form of accountability 
relationships developed by accountability scholars (see Appendix 2). 
The development of the accountability relationships indicates that the government officials 
and institutions were facing more diverse and more demanding accountability (Thomas, 2003).   
Behn (2000) regarded the diversity of accountability relationships as 360-degrees 
accountability because each individual who is part of a public agency would be accountable to 
all others.  Pollit and Hupe (2011) contend that with the introduction of the concept of 360-
degree of accountability, the principal accountability relationship between the accountor and 
accountee is continuous.  The model of accountability continues to grow as the role of the state 
develops. The next subsection discusses the development of the accountability model in the era 
of the market state model. 
4. NPM, Post-NPM and the “New” Model of Accountability 
The market state model has brought a new dimension to the role of the state and the 
framework of public service delivery.  With the objective of improving efficiency in terms of cost 
and quality of public service delivery, the private sector, including social society or 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) was invited to be a public partner in providing public 
goods and services. This means that service delivery has changed from a political activity to a 
technical issue, with greater emphasis placed on technical information such as accounting, 
budgeting and performance measurement (Kluvers & Tippett, 2012). In relation to this 
development, the use of private institutions and management techniques was highly promoted 
in the public sector.  Notwithstanding the fact that these techniques improved certain levels of 
efficiency, there are risks associated with these approaches, especially in relation to 
accountability (Aucoin, 1990; Barberis, 1998; Blanchard, Hinnant, & Wong, 1998; Christensen & 
Laegreid, 2011; Goldfinch & Wallis, 2010; Mongkol, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1994).   
As discussed earlier, the public sector reform under NPM and post-NPM was driven by new 
technologies, privatisation, and new forms of management such as networks, joined-up 
government and public-private partnership. The adoption of these new strategies changed the 
way government operated and also created new ways of making government accountable for 
what they do (Pollit & Hupe, 2011).  The concept of accountability was expanded and went 
beyond rendering an account of the resources used, but with more concern about the efficient 
use of those resources and the effectiveness of policy decisions (Kluvers, 2003).  Therefore, 
 
 
competition and efficiency values have become institutionalised across the public sector, 
leading to a greater control of performance by the executives. 
According to Day and Klein (1987), the notion of accountability during this era of reform 
was underpinned by two assumptions. The first assumption was that efficiency and 
accountability are two sides of the same conceptual coin.  This means that the policy efficiency 
would be achieved if managerial accountability improved.  The second assumption was that 
accountability should be more focused on overall performance rather than concerned with 
scrutinising individual action.  Therefore, accountability should be measured according to the 
achievement of policy goals or objectives.  These assumptions indicate that the focus of 
accountability has shifted from the adherence of formal procedure to emphasis on resource 
allocation and goal attainment.  The changes have also signalled that governments are taking on 
a more horizontal character.  It can be seen that political accountability has slowly reduced and 
managerial accountability which largely emphasised efficiency began to dominate the form of 
accountability relationship.   
Managerial accountability has introduced new form of accountability called horizontal 
accountability.  Horizontal accountability is a condition where agencies report to others who are 
not their principals, such as peers, clients and stakeholders (Schillemans, 2010; Willems & Van 
Dooren, 2012).  Horizontal accountability becomes an essential extension function for 
hierarchical accountability (Shcillemans, 2008).  Specifically, managerial accountability is less 
concerns about controlling resources but highly focuses on the policy effectiveness and 
efficiency This shows that NPM and post-NPM has promoted a “new” form of accountability, 
which is shaped by a mixture of hierarchical and horizontal accountability relationships inside 
and outside the public sector and highly focused on results and outcomes (Lapsley, 2008).   
Table 3 summarises the development of the model of the state and the changes in the 
service delivery framework and the form of accountability relationship (see Appendix 3).  
 
5. THE EFFECTS OF REFORM ON ACCOUNTABILITY  
The continual process of reform has obviously developed the notion of accountability.  As the 
state increased its degree of intervention, the size and functions of public sector enlarged 
accordingly.  During the pre-NPM era for example, the notion of accountability enhanced from 
its traditional hierarchical setting to a mixed of hierarchical and horizontal accountability 
setting, following the insertion of horizontal accountability in the hierarchical accountability 
system.  Consequently, the focus of accountability in the system of government moved from 
political based accountability to administrative based accountability. The shift in the 
accountability focus from maintaining law and order to providing public welfare and ensuring 
impartiality and equal treatment had developed a multiple and diversified accountability 
relationships in the public sector.  
Meanwhile, the process of reform in the era of NPM and post-NPM created a more 
challenging environment for accountability.  The effort to get the public and private sector to 
interact has led to some structural mergers between political and managerial structures 
(Christensen & Laegreid, 2011).  Structural mergers between the public and private 
organisations reduced the role of government as central state resources.  As a result, 
government became a part of network which was conceptualised as dependent on the other 
actors to the same extent like those actors were dependent on government (Rhodes, 1994).  The 
adoption of the structural mergers can be seen through the collaboration and coordination 
policies between the public and private sector such as joined-up government, privatisation, 
public-private partnership, contracting-out and corporatisation. Under this policy approaches, 
the provision of public goods and services were provided by governments through the private 
partners.  
Managerial accountability brought a new dimension in the public sector accountability 
as it emphasised a strong values of the private sector such as greater competition and efficiency, 
value for money, and accountability for results (Willems & Van Dooren, 2012).  In addition to 
 
 
that, managerial accountability also broadened the level of complexity in the accountability 
practices following the insertion of the private sector as a new accountability agent.  Although 
managerial accountability promised for improving accountability and increasing the level of 
efficiency in the public sector, Jones and Kettl (2003, p. 3) claimed “accountability promised 
more than it delivered”.   
Most of the scholars have largely argued the adoption of managerial accountability in 
governing the public service delivery as it ability to perform its functions was doubtful.  The 
arguments can be seen through the negative narratives about accountability.  For example, 
accountability was reported as potentially complex, contradictory and confusing (Willems & 
Van Dooren, 2012).  Accountability is also being portrayed as ambiguous (Messner, 2009; 
Mordaunt, 2006; Ryan & Walsh, 2004), as multifaceted (Acar, 2001; Acar, Guo, & Yang, 2008) 
and, as multidimensional (Fimreite & Laegreid, 2009). Conflicting in the accountability 
expectation has been labelled as multiple accountabilities disorder (Willems & Van Dooren, 
2012) or accountability deficits Bovens (2010).  The negative narratives imply that the 
contemporary changes in the role of the state and public service delivery have critical 
implications for accountability.  
Additionally, Christensen and Laegreid (2011) argued that improved accountability and 
improved performance are two different things and not necessarily pull in the same direction.  
Meanwhile, (Jones & Kettl, 2003) contended that reform per se is insufficient to ensure 
accountability as reform is only necessary to strengthen the institution of government and 
management.  This means that the adoption of new policy strategy with the objective of 
improving efficiency and accountability may not be achieved as claimed by governments as 
these two objectives are different. Hence, because of these situations, Hodge and Greeve (2007) 
stressed that how well accountability function in the context of NPM and post-NPM reform is 
obviously unknown.   
The implications for accountability can be understood from three accountability 
perspectives namely, the standards of accountability, the agent of accountability and the means 
of accountability (Haque, 2000). The standards of accountability refer to the criteria for which 
public officials are held accountable to citizens. Since the goal of NPM focused on policy 
effectiveness and efficiency, the normative standards of accountability had changed its focus 
from compliance with rules, regulation and procedure towards efficiency, performance and 
value for money (Pollit and Hupe, 2011). This means that, instead of being answerable for the 
social welfare and citizens’ rights, policy implementers is increasingly accountable for 
maximising profit, boosting efficiency and productivity and ascertaining cost effectiveness 
(Haque, 2000).  However, these new accountability standards are intangible and immeasurable 
in nature.  Therefore, it is not always possible to make the policy implementers accountable for 
their intangible performance (Haque, 2000; Cendon, 2000).  This indicated that the adoption of 
managerial accountability as a new accountability mechanism apparently is challenging, 
especially when it comes to the evaluation and scrutinising processes.     
Meanwhile, the accountability agent refers to whom policy implementers is eventually 
accountable (Haque, 2000).  Bovens (2005) defined accountability agent as a forum, which can 
be individuals, organisational and institutions. The agent or forum in the context of managerial 
accountability has been portrayed as complex. Managerial accountability involved a mixed of 
hierarchical and horizontal accountability relationships within agencies in the public sector and 
between agencies in the public and private sector marked the eclipse of this form of 
accountability.  This structure allows accountability to be demanded from a range of forum 
inside and outside the public sector including politicians, public officials, citizens, and also the 
private partners.  High accountability demand from a range forum creates difficulties for the 
policy implementers such as conflicting in accountability.  This is because the policy 
implementers have to adopt multiple identities in a different context of accountability.  For 
example, Newman (2004) described the multiple accountabilities held by policy implementers 
in performing their roles: 
at one moment being the agent of government, trying to deliver on its policy pledges; at 
another, a good public servant being held to account through bureaucratic channels to 
 
 
the relevant minister; at another, a member of a partnership body seeking to cut 
through bureaucracy in order to make something happen; at another, an organisational 
leader with accountability to staff and other organisational stakeholders; at another, a 
responsive change agent, accountable to those whom the organisation is seeking to 
serve (users, communities, a public at large). (p. 20) 
 
According to Willems and Van Dooren (2012), the involvement of various policy 
implementers in a complex relationship caused for another problem called “overcrowded 
forum”.  As a result of this situation, Pollit and Hupe (2011) contended, “many different officials 
contribute in many ways to decisions and policies of government it is difficult even in principle 
to identify who is morally responsible for political outcomes” (p. 648).   
The means of accountability also affected following the adoption of managerial 
accountability.  The means of accountability refer to how accountability was ensured by the 
government. Haque (2000) highlights that the adoption of NPM and post-NPM strategies 
increased challenges to the means of accountability. As discussed earlier, during the NPM and 
post-NPM reform, the roles of political representatives to scrutinise the service delivery 
agencies limited because some of the agencies run like a private corporation with maximum 
operational autonomy (Haque, 2000).  In addition to that, the political leaders may have no 
experience and resources to scrutinise and evaluate these newly formed agencies. Furthermore, 
the changes in the criteria of evaluation from process-oriented to result oriented also created 
difficulties in managerial accountability as it highly focused on “what is being achieved” rather 
than “how the achievement are made”.   
The discussion of accountability in the context of reform indicates that managerial 
accountability is facing several challenges with regard to changes in the roles of the state and 
the framework service delivery.  Although managerial accountability promised for improving 
efficiency and also accountability, the ability of managerial accountability was doubtful. The 
outlined of the challenges in managerial accountability showed that accountability in the era of 





Reform is one of the ways in which organisations respond to their environmental 
pressures.  In public sector, the implementation of reform is influenced by the role of the state. 
Public sector reform has brought significant changes in terms of functions, roles and framework 
in government, including the accountability system. This article discussed the development of 
the notion of accountability in the context of public sector reform.  Obviously, the notion of 
accountability developed according to the objectives of reform which set by the state.  However, 
as state develops, the reform process has increased the complexity in accountability, which in 
turned it creates difficulties in implementing accountability requirements and achieving the 
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 At this stage the accountor is responsible to account or to 






 At this stage, the accountor has to meet certain levels of 
accountee expectations, which have been agreed by both 
parties earlier.  
 The accountee can pose questions to get more detailed 
information and the accountor has to provide justifications 
and explanations. 




 At this stage the accountee evaluates the conduct of the 
accountor by referring to the accountee’s justifications and 
explanations, and makes decisions regarding o the sanctions 
to control the activities of the accountor.   
 The accountor has to accept the sanctions.  



















Table 2:  The framework of accountability relationships 
Researcher(s) Types of accountability relationships 
Romzek and Dubnick 
(1987); Jonston and 
Romzek (1999) 
Introduced four types of accountability: 
Hierarchical/bureaucratic  accountability  
 Formal and hierarchical accountability relationship between a 
superior and a subordinate.  
 Systems of accountability are based on standard operating procedure 
or clearly stated rules and regulations. 
 Basis of relationship is supervision. 
Legal accountability 
 Formal and hierarchical accountability relationship between a 
controlling party inside (an organisation’s management) and outside 
the organisations (law maker). 
 Basis of relationship is fiduciary. 
Political accountability 
 Relationships between representatives and his or her constituencies.   
For example between elected official and citizen, agency head and 
general public or organisations and customers. 
 Basis of relationship is responsive to constituency. 
Professional accountability 
 The placement of control over organisational activities in the hands of 
expert employees. 
Basis of relationship is deference to expertise. 
Sinclair (1995) Introduced five forms of accountability relationships.   
Political accountability 
 A direct line or chain of accountability links the public servant with 
public manager, in turn accountable to the minister, to the executive or 
cabinet, to parliament and hence to the electors. 
 The form of relationship is formal. 
Public accountability 
 More informal but direct accountability to the public, interested 
community groups and individuals. 
 Involves answering, through various mechanisms from newspaper 
reports to hearings.  
 Treated as complementary to public accountability.  
Managerial accountability 
 Formal and hierarchical relationship. 
 A superior calls to account a subordinate for the performance of 
delegated duties. 
Professional accountability 
 This accountability invokes the sense of duty that one has as a member 
of a professional or expert group which, in turn, occupies a privilege 
and knowledgeable position in society. 
Personal accountability 
 This refers to basic value such as respect for human dignity and acting 
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The form of accountability : 
Hierarchical 





 Legal   







The form of accountability : 
Hierarchical with diversified 
relationships. 





 Legal   
 Professional 







The form of accountability : 
Hierarchical with diversified 
relationships. 





 Legal   
 Professional 
 Bureaucratic  









The form of accountability : 
Mixed between hierarchical and 
horizontal accountability within 
the public sector and between 
public and private sectors 





















The form of accountability : 
Mixed between hierarchical and 
horizontal accountability within 
the public sector and between 
public and private sectors 




 Legal   
 Professional 
 Managerial 
 
 
 
